u 


UC-NRLF 


GIFT  OF 
.  I  .L.Leupp 


PERSONNEL  VERSUS  MATERIEL  IN  PLANS  FOR 
NATIONAL  DEFENSE 


PREPARED  BY  THE  WAR  COLLEGE  DIVISION,  GENERAL  STAFF  CORPS 

AS    A    SUPPLEMENT    TO    THE    STATEMENT    OF    A    PROPER    MILITARY 

POLICY  FOR  THE  UNITED  STATES 


WCD  9314-1 


ARMY  WAR  COLLEGE  :  WASHINGTON 

NOVEMBER,   1915 


626 


WASHINGTON 

GOVERNMENT  PRINTING  OFFICE 
1915 


T  1 


WAR  DEPARTMENT, 

Document  No.  526. 

Office  of  the  Chief  of  Staff. 


SYNOPSIS. 


Page. 

1.  Effect  of  views  of  noted  men  on  public  opinion 5 

2.  Influence  of  present  European  war  on  military  policy 5 

3.  Importance  of  materiel  exaggerated  by  special  situation  in  France  and 

Flanders 5 

4.  Necessity  of  materiel  and  latest  mechanical  devices  in  war 5 

5.  Arms  and  ammunition  required  for  1,000,000  men 6 

6.  Vital  importance  of  trained  personnel  in  war 6 

7.  An  army  a  complicated  machine t> 

8.  Trained  operatives  imperative  for  complex  machinery 7 

9.  Correlation  and  interdependence  of  the  mobile  arms 7 

10.  Influence  of  materiel  on  issue  of  war — Trained  personnel  vital  requisite..  8 

11.  Results  of  employment  of  untrained  troops  by  United  States  in  past  wars. .  8 

12.  Employment  of  untrained  troops  by  France  during  Franco-Prussian  War..  9 

13.  Relative  importance  of  materiel  and  personnel— Statement  of  Gen.  von 

Bernhardi 10 

14.  Limitations  of  a  "Raw  army" — Napoleon.     Nueve  Chapelle  an  example..  11 

15.  Time  required  for  training  new  levies — Opinion  of  an  American  in  British 

Army 11 

16.  Deductions  from  British  losses  in  present  European  war '    12 

17.  Development  of  armies — Peace  training  necessary 13 

18.  Conclusions „  ^ 14 

30669°— No.  526-16  (3) 


6673S3 


PERSONNEL  VERSUS  MATfiRIEL  IN  PLANS  FOR 
NATIONAL  DEFENSE. 


1.  EFFECT  OF  VIEWS  OF  NOTED  MEN  ON  PUBLIC  OPINION. 

Kecently  one  of  our  most  noted  men  in  the  field  of  science  and 
invention  was  quoted  in  the  press  of  the  country  to  the  effect  that 
wars  in  the  future  will  be  fought  by  machines  and  not  by  men.  The 
question  of  national  defense  is  of  such  paramount  importance  at 
the  present  time  that  anything  that  a  well  and  favorably  known 
man  says  may  have  great  influence  in  molding  public  opinion  and 
thereby  be  productive  of  national  good  or  national  harm. 

2.  INFLUENCE  OF  PRESENT  EUROPEAN  WAR  ON  MILITARY  POLICY. 

It  is  believed  that  the  deductions  that  have  already  been  made 
from  the  present  European  war,  and  will  be  made  in  the  future, 
will  exert  a  vast  influence  in  shaping  our  military  policy.  We  should 
exercise,  then,  the  greatest  care  that  our  conclusions  are  sound  and 
not  too  hastily  drawn.  It  is  not  the  present  war  alone,  but  war  in 
general  that  we  must  study,  if  we  would  reach  sound  conclusions. 
A  conclusion  that  is  drawn  from  a  single  example  is  almost  sure 
to  be  wrong.  For  that  reason  the  European  war  should  be  con- 
sidered as  only  one  of  many  wars  that  should  furnish  us  the  infor- 
mation in  the  light  of  which  our  military  policy  should  be  framed. 

3.  IMPORTANCE  OF  MATERIEL  EXAGGERATED  BY  SPECIAL  SITUA- 

TION IN  FRANCE  AND  FLANDERS. 

The  great  war  now  being  fought  in  Europe  has  created  in  the 
minds  of  many  influential  people  the  fixed  idea  that  materiel  is 
everything  in  modern  war  and  that  personnel  counts  for  but  little. 
This  idea  has  been  fostered  by  a  consideration  of  the  situation  as 
developed  in  France  and  Flanders,  while  the  lessons  to  be  learned 
from  a  study  of  the  great  campaigns  in  other  theaters  have  been 
almost  entirely  overlooked. 

4.  NECESSITY  OF  MATERIEL  AND  LATEST  MECHANICAL  DEVICES 

IN  WAR. 

This  is  indeed  an  age  of  mechanics.  The  development  in  labor- 
saving  machines  and  mechanical  devices  has  been  marvelous.  The 

526  (5) 


machinery  of  war  has  kept  pace  with  the  development  in  the  indus- 
trial field,  and  in  many  respects  has  even  surpassed  it.  No  one  will 
contend  that  a  mobile  army  not  equipped  with  the  most  modern 
appliances  of  war — that  is,  magazine  rifles,  machine  guns,  field  guns, 
aircraft,  motor  transport,  etc. — can  be  successful  in  war.  It  is  con- 
ceded that  the  United  States  should  keep  on  hand  materiel  to  fully 
equip  an  army  of  the  size  which  we  determine  will  be  necessary  to 
meet  any  of  the  first-class  powers  that  are  likely  to  attack  us. 

5.  ARMS  AND  AMMUNITION  REQUIRED   FOR  ONE   MILLION  MEN. 

The  following  estimate  of  the  supplies  of  rifles,  machine  guns, 
field  guns,  and  ammunition  that  would  be  required  by  an  army  of 
a  million  men  at  the  beginning  of  a  campaign,  under  modern  condi- 
tions, is  based  on  a  careful  study  of  actual  conditions  in  the  European 
theater  of  war. 

Army  of  1,000,000. 


Reserve  sup- 

Monthly supply  for  first  four  months.3 

ply  at  open- 

Article. 

ing  of  war. 
(Estimated 
loss  and  ex- 
penditure 

Supply  with 
troops  for 
mobiliza- 

First 

Second 

Third 

Fourth 

during  first 

month. 

month. 

month. 

month. 

four  months 

of  war.)1 

Rifles    

500,000 

800,000 

90,000 

180,000 

180,000 

90,000 

Machine  guns 

2  500 

5,000 

400 

800 

800 

400 

Cartridges  

2,250,000,000 
3,000 

1,020,000,000 
6,000 

500,000,000 
500 

1,000,000,000 
1,000 

1,000,000,000 
1,000 

500,000,000 
500 

Field  guns 

Ammunition  for  field 

guns  

'10,000 

'2,000 

2,000 

2,000 

•4,000 

•2,000 

i  These  supplies  are  to  be  maintained  at  these  figures  at  all  times  during  the  war  to  provide  a  reservoir. 

sln  the  case  of  the  rifle  cartridges  the  amount  may  be  too  small. 

1  These  amounts  show  the  estimated  expenditure  for  each  of  the  first  four  months  of  the  war. 

4  Rounds  per  gun. 

6.  VITAL  IMPORTANCE  OF  TRAINED  PERSONNEL  IN  WAR. 

A  study  of  the  above  figures  shows  the  vital  importance  of  materiel 
in  modern  war  and  the  hopelessness  of  any  war  in  which  we  might 
be  engaged  with  any  country  having  a  trained  army,  should  we  fail 
to  be  amply  provided  with  such  materiel.  But  many  people  believe 
that,  if  we  are  well  supplied  with  the  modern  machinery  of  war, 
there  will  be  no  need  of  a  trained  personnel.  There  can  be  no 
greater  fallacy  nor  one  likely  to  bring  greater  disaster  to  the  country 
if  acted  on  to  the  extent  that  some  influential  men  believe  possible. 

7.  AN  ARMY  A  COMPLICATED  MACHINE. 

It  must  not  be  forgotten  that  an  army  itself  is  the  most  marvelous 
and,  at  the  same  time,  the  most  complicated  machine  connected  with 
the  carrying  on  of  war,  and  to  the  degree  of  perfection  with  which 

526 


it  is  organized,  trained,  and  equipped  in  every  part  and  detail  will 
depend  victory  or  defeat. 

8.  TRAINED  OPERATIVES  IMPERATIVE  FOR  COMPLEX  MACHINERY. 

A  chain  is  no  stronger  than  its  weakest  link.  It  might  as  well  be 
contended  that  one  of  the  parts  of  a  giant  locomotive  could  be  made 
of  indifferent  metal,  as  that  an  efficient  army  could  be  made  up  of  an 
untrained  personnel.  As  the  weak  part  of  the  locomotive  will  sooner 
or  later  snap  and  break,  and  probably  at  the  most  critical  time,  so 
will  an  army  of  untrained  or  partially  trained  men  go  to  pieces  under 
the  great  shock  of  modern  battle.  As  well  might  we  say  'that  it  is 
as  possible  to  go  into  the  streets  of  one  of  our  cities,  or  to  our  farms, 
pick  up  a  lot  of  untrained  men  and  set  them  to  wTork  with  the  intri- 
cate machinery  of  one  of  our  great  gun  factories,  as  it  is  to  put  the 
same  men  to  handling  the  complicated  machines  of  modern  war  or  to 
make  them  parts  of  that  most  complex  of  all  machines,  a  modern 
army,  and  expect  them  to  be  successful  against  a  highly  trained  and 
organized  army  of  one  of  the  first-class  powers.  As  you  would  ex- 
pect the  gun  factory  to  be  speedily  disorganized  and  disabled  by 
such  a  proceeding,  just  so  surely  will  an  army  of  untrained  or  par- 
tially trained  men  come  to  disaster  in  the  stress  of  Avar,  and  all  the 
latest  types  of  rifles,  machine  guns,  high-powered  cannon,  aeroplanes, 
motor  transport,  and  mountains  of  ammunition  in  its  possession  will 
not  and  can  not  save  it. 

9.  CORRELATION  AND  INTERDEPENDENCE  OF  THE  MOBILE  ARMS. 

The  tendency  to  exaggerate  the  importance  of  materiel  in  modern 
war  and  to  underrate  personnel  comes  from  the  superficial  conclu- 
sions which  have  been  drawn  from  the  observations  that  have  been 
made  of  the  present  war  in  Europe,  and,  as  stated  above,  the  events 
in  Flanders  and  France,  likewise  in  the  Dardanelles,  where  the  war 
has  settled  to  the  condition  of  a  siege  on  both  sides,  have  formed  the 
basis  of  most  conclusions,  while  the  operations  in  the  eastern  and 
Serbian  theaters,  which  probably  more  nearly  approach  those  of  any 
war  in  which  the  United  States  might  be  engaged,  have  practically 
been  overlooked. 

To  be  sure,  in  this  siege  warfare  the  role  of  artillery  takes  on  considerable 
importance,  and  only  the  large  cannon  can  crush  casemates  buried  several 
meters  under  the  earth.  To  it  falls  almost  the  entire  task  of  the  preparation 
against  an  enemy  who  is  at  the  same  time  too  close  and  invisible  and  who 
thus  escapes  both  the  75-millimeter  shell  and  the  bullet  of  the  rifle.  But  as 
soon  as  this  zone  of  siege  warfare  is  crossed  and  space  is  opened,  the  bullet 
will  recover  its  field  of  action  beyond  that  covered  by  the  75-millimeter  gun, 
the  cannon  of  maneuver  warfare.  The  war  of  1914  has  cruelly  proved  to  us 
that  between  the  preparation  of  the  attack  by  the  artillery  and  the  execution 

526 


8 

of  this  attack  with  the  bayonet  a  period  and  a  zone  intervene  where  the 
infantry  should  be  supreme,  if  it  knows  how  to  deliver  a  fire  that  kills.  *  *  * 
This  man  is  the  king  of  the  battle  field ;  he  rules  it  through  his  intelligent 
fire,  his  aimed  bullets,  which  the  accurate  rifle  has  cured  from  being  wild ;  he 
rules  it  by  the  work  which  completes  and  continues  the  preparations  of  the 
artillery  and  which  will  make  easy  the  effect  of  the  bayonet  against  an  enemy 
already  three-quarters  annihilated.  (Gen.  Cherfils,  French  Army.) 

In  short,  the  role  of  the  mobile  arms  has  not  changed  materially ; 
in  other  words,  we  must  still  have  artillery  to  destroy  the  enemy's 
position,  infantry  to  assault  and  drive  him  from  it,  and  cavalry  to 
pursue  and  complete  his  destruction.  It  should,  moreover,  be  borne 
in  mind  that  in  point  of  time  mobile  operations  precede  the  static 
and  are  therefore  the  first  in  order  of  preparation. 

10.  INFLUENCE  OF  MATERIEL  ON  ISSUE  OF  WAR— TRAINED 
PERSONNEL  VITAL  REQUISITE. 

The  influence  of  materiel  on  the  issue  of  a  war  is  usually  much 
overemphasized.  It  floats  on  the  surface  of  events,  where  it  catches 
the  eye  of  the  superficial  observer,  ignorant  of  the  prof ounder  move- 
ments beneath.  This  tendency  to  overrate  its  influence  is  increased 
by  the  natural  human  inclination  to  attribute  defeat  to  materiel 
rather  than  personal  causes.  It  is  natural  for  men  who  have  spent 
all  their  time  and  best  efforts  in  the  field  of  science  and  invention 
to  believe  that  the  mechanical  or  materiel  side  of  war  is  all-impor- 
tant, but  there  can  be  no  greater  mistake.  A  trained  personnel  has 
been  a  most  vital  requisite  of  armies  in  the  past  and  will  continue  to 
be  in  the  future. 

The  whole  military  history  of  the  United  States  proclaims  the 
truth  of  this. 

11.  RESULTS  OF  EMPLOYMENT  OF  UNTRAINED  TROOPS  BY  UNITED 
STATES  IN  PAST  WARS. 

'  During  the  Kevolutionary  War  the  Colonies  depended  almost  en- 
tirely on  untrained  or  partially  trained  men.  During  the  entire 
course  of  this  war  Great  Britain  employed  not  more  than  150,000 
men,  yet  the  total  number  of  British  troops  in  the  Colonies  at  any 
time  was  very  much  less ;  while  the  Colonies  themselves  used  395,858 
men,  notwithstanding  which  the  largest  force  that  Washington  was 
ever  able  to  assemble  for  battle  at  one  time  was  about  17,000.  Speak- 
ing of  the  unreliability  of  untrained  or  partially  trained  troops, 
he  said: 

Regular  troops  alone  are  equal  to  the  exigencies  of  modern  war,  as  well  for 
defense  as  offense,  and  when  a  substitute  is  attempted  it  must  prove  illusory 
and  ruinous.  No  militia  will  ever  acquire  the  habits  necessary  to  resist  a 
regular  force.  *  *  *  The  firmness  requisite  for  the  real  business  of  fighting 
is  only  to  be  attained  by  a  constant  course  of  discipline  and  service.  I  have 
526 


never  yet  been  witness  to  a  single  instance  that  can  justify  a  different  opinion, 
and  it  is  most  earnestly  to  be  wished  that  the  liberties  of  America  may  no 
longer  be  trusted,  in  any  material  degree,  to  so  precarious  a  dependence. 
(Washington.) 

During  the  War  of  1812  the  United  States  employed  527,654  men, 
of  whom  only  a  small  proportion  were  regular  soldiers,  and  most  of 
these  were  Regulars  in  name  only,  for  the  majority  of  regular  regi- 
ments were  organized  after  the  beginning  of  the  war,  while  Great 
Britain  employed  only  67,000  men,  and  never  at  one  time  had  more 
than  16,000  men  opposed  to  us  on  any  field  of  battle.  That  we  did 
not  suffer  a  great  disaster  was  undoubtedly  due  to  the  fact  that 
Great  Britain,  during  this  entire  war,  was  engaged  in  her  gigantic 
contest  with  Napoleon,  and  used  only  the  odds  and  ends  of  her  mili- 
tary forces  against  us. 

The  Civil  War  was  fought  by  volunteer  troops  on  both  sides,  and 
it  was  not  until  the  United  States  had  spent  several  fruitless  years 
in  training  her  new  armies  and  had  suffered  great  losses  in  men  and 
money  that  we  had  any  real  military  success.  Competent  critics  are 
of  the  opinion  that  had  the  United  States  had  at  the  first  Bull  Run 
a  brigade  of  Grant's  veteran  army  that  brought  about  the  sur- 
render of  Lee  at  Appomattox  there  would  have  been  no  Civil  War. 
The  Confederates  were  almost  as  badly  demoralized  by  their  victory 
in  this  battle  as  the  Federals  were  by  defeat,  but  their  victory  gave 
time,  priceless  almost  beyond  anything  else  in  war  to  an  unprepared 
nation,  to  train  and  equip  their  armies.  The  money  that  was  spent 
during  that  war  and  has  been  spent  since  on  the  aftermath  of  it 
(pensions,  interest  on  the  national  debt,  etc.)  would  have  main- 
tained and  would  now  maintain  an  army  that  would  insure  the 
United  States  adequate  defense. 

12.  EMPLOYMENT  OF   UNTRAINED  TROOPS   BY    FRANCE    DURING 
FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR. 

The  folly  and  futility  of  intrusting  the  interests  of  a  nation  in 
war  to  untrained  or  partially  trained  troops  can  not  be  better  illus- 
trated than  by  the  experience  of  France  following  the  surrender 
of  the  French  Army  at  Metz  in  1870. 

Marshal  McMahon  surrendered  the  army  of  Chalons  on  September  2; 
Marshal  Bazaine  surrendered  the  army  of  the  Rhine  at  Metz  on  October 
27.  *  *  *  The  war  should  have  ended  then,  but  there  were  hundreds  of 
thousands  of  patriotic  men  left  in  the  country,  and  there  were  statesmen  then, 
as  now,  who  thought  nothing  was  necessary  to  create  an  army  except  to  collect 
men  and  place  arms  in  their  hands. 

At  Paris  the  Empire  had  been  overthrown  and  a  provisional  government 
established  at  Tours,  with  Gambetta  as  virtual  dictator.  This  extraordinary 
man,  whom  no  misfortune  could  conquer,  set  to  work  to  raise  armies,  and  with 
such  herculean  energy  and  ability  that  within  a  few  weeks  half  a  million  men 

526 


10 

had  been  assembled  and  fairly  well  equipped.  Armies  of  100,000  men  were 
improvised  almost  overnight  in  the  northwest  and  south.  Unfortunately  Gam- 
betta  found  no  leader  of  his  own  mold,  and  his  tireless  efforts  finally  went  for 
naught. 

Nor  were  the  armies  themselves  ever  competent.  Time  was  lacking.  The 
experienced  officers  were  almost  all  prisoners  of  war.  Organization  was  loose ; 
supplies  irregular  or  lacking ;  even  the  clothing  was  insufficient  for  a  winter 
campaign.  Poor  discipline,  wounds,  disease,  exhaustion,  cold,  and  famine 
ravaged  these  vast  armies  of  volunteers  and  conscripts  and  strewed  the  roads 
of  France  with  their  debris. 

Unless  it  be  the  retreat  from  Moscow,  there  is  no  sadder  picture  in  all  his- 
tory than  one  of  these  intensely  patriotic  but  helpless  bodies  of  men,  driven 
about  by  the  iron  German  veteran  armies,  suffering  all  possible  miseries  and 
wretchedly  perishing  to  no  purpose  during  the  winter  of  1870-71.  They  did 
not  even  have  the  satisfaction  of  inflicting  heavy  losses  on  the  enemy,  as  did 
the  armies  of  McMahon  and  Bazaine;  but  with  little  loss  to  the  Germans 
sacrificed  themselves  by  thousands  in  hopeless  defeats  and  then  struggled  off 
along  the  roads,  carrying  disease  to  the  villages  which  sheltered  them  and 
themselves  perishing  uncared  for  in  the  snow.  Their  history  should  be  a  ter- 
rible example  for  those  who  trust  in  new  levies  against  experienced  and 
efficient  regular  troops.  (Le  Corps  de  Sante  Militaire  en  France,  by  Brice  et 
Botteet. ) 

Anyone  who  believes  that  an  army  can  be  called  into  existence 
overnight  or  that  the  liberty  of  a  country  can  be  intrusted  to  an 
army  of  untrained  or  partially  trained  troops  should  read  the  pitiful 
story  of  these  armies  of  Gambetta,  from  which  the  above  is  quoted. 

13.  RELATIVE  IMPORTANCE  OF  MATERIEL  AND  PERSONNEL- 
STATEMENT  OF  GEN.  VON  BERNHARDI. 

In  an  article  contributed  to  the  New  York  Tribune,  Gen.  von 
Bernhardi,  author  of  "Germany  and  the  next  war,"  tell  us  what 
observations  show  to  be  true  when  he  says : 

It  is  constantly  said  on  the  other  side  that  the  success  in  a  decisive  manner 
depends  on  the  quantity  of  munitions  which  is  available,  and  that,  aside  from 
the  superior  masses,  the  technical  means  wrere  instrumental  to  success.  It  is 
constantly  emphasized  that,  in  contrast  to  former  wars,  these  factors  are  to-day 
determining.  How  little  have  men  who  hold  this  belief  penetrated  into  the  real 
spirit  of  the  war!  Munitions  in  sufficient  quantities  certainly  are  essential 
in  warfare,  and  the  technical  means  of  warfare  are  certainly  an  important 
factor  to  success,  and  it  is  surely  not  of  little  importance  that  just  in  this 
respect,  in  the  technique  of  war,  we  are  in  advance  of  our  enemies.  The 
superiority  in  artillery  and  in  number  is,  of  course,  of  prime  importance. 
The  masses,  however,  win  their  decisive  importance  only  when  they  have  been 
trained  in  discipline  and  capability,  are  full  of  belligerent  spirit,  and  are  led 
by  men  who  are  thoroughly  aware  of  what  brings  results  in  war  and  who  are 
masters  of  their  professions  or,  rather,  art.  Munitions  and  technical  war  ma- 
terials achieve  their  full  value  only  when  they  are  used  with  a  purpose  and 
with  valiant  military  spirit. 
526 


11 

14.  LIMITATIONS  OF  A   "  RAW  ARMY  "—NAPOLEON.    NUEVE 
CHAPELLE  AN  EXAMPLE. 

With  a  raw  army  it  is  possible  to  parry  a  formidable  position,  but  not  to  carry 
out  a  plan.  (Napoleon.) 

15.  TIME  REQUIRED  FOR  TRAINING  NEW  LEVIES— OPINION  OF  AN 
AMERICAN  IN  BRITISH  ARMY. 

The  course  of  very  intensive  training  prescribed  for  the  new 
levies  of  the  British  Army  at  the  beginning  of  the  war  contem- 
plated having  them  ready  for  active  service  on  the  firing  line  in 
six  months.  But  few  of  these  men  were  sent  to  France  with  less 
than  nine  months'  training.  What  was  the  reason  for  the  change 
of  plan  of  the  British  Army  authorities,  especially  in  view  of  the 
great  and  pressing  necessity  for  troops  in  France?  It  is  believed 
that  it  was  found  that  troops  with  the  six  months'  very  intensive 
training  which  had  been  given  them  had  neither  the  physical  hardi- 
hood, the  morale,  nor  the  knowledge  of  the  business  of  war  which 
was  absolutely  essential  to  make  progress  against  the  intrenched 
troops  opposing  them.  In  this*  connection  the  following  quotation 
from  a  letter  written  by  an  American  now  serving  with  the  British 
Army  in  France,  is  pertinent : 

In  common  with  all  of  my  comrades  in  one  of  the  first  units  of  Lord  Kitch- 
ener's first  citizen  army,  I  believed  that  within  a  few  weeks  of  enlistment  we 
should  be  fighting  side  by  side  with  the  seasoned  regulars  of  the  first  British 
expeditionary  force.  But  after  three  months  of  hard  work  we  began  to  appre- 
ciate the  tremendous  difficulties  of  the  task  we  had  in  hand.  During  those 
three  months  we  had  worked  from  5.30  in  the  morning  until  4.30  in  the  after- 
noon every  day  in  the  week,  Sunday  excepted.  And  yet,  at  the  end  of  that 
time,  we  had  mastered  only  the  fundamentals  of  squad,  platoon,  and  company 
drill  and  some  elementary  knowledge  of  battle  formations  and  of  the  use  of 
our  rifles.  We  were  no  more  cohesive  than  so  many  grains  of  wet  sand.  We 
were  still  so  many  individuals,  fretting  under  the  restraints  of  discipline,  and 
no  more  fit  to  be  called  soldiers  than  apprentices  of  three  months  are  to  be 
called  mechanics. 

Many  of  the  men  had  been  used  to  a  healthy  out-of-doors  life,  but  even  they 
were  far  from  fit  for  the  rigors  and  hardships  of  soldiering.  How  much  less 
so  were  those  indoor  workers — the  clerks,  the  shop  assistants,  the  small  mer- 
chants— fit  for  it.  *  *  *  But  it  was  not  until  they  had  been  through 
months  of  the  hardest  kind  of  work  that  they  were  physically  efficient.  Ten 
or  twelve  weeks'  training  would  have  never  given  these  men  the  physical 
stamina  enabling  them  to  endure  the  terrible  fatigues  of  a  rapid  strategic 
retreat  like  that  from  Mons.  They  would  have  dropped  out  on  the  roadside 
by  tens  of  thousands,  to  be  gathered  in  by  the  swiftly  advancing  enemy. 
*  *  *  And  so  we  went  on  from  week  to  week  and  from  month  to  month,  and 
it  was  Hot  until  we  had  been  trained  for  nine  months  that  we  were  sent  to  the 
"  Somewhere  Trench  "  to  take  our  part  in  the  greatest  war  in  history.  *  *  * 
Four  months  of  active  service  in  France  has  convinced  us  how  necessary,  how 
vitally  necessary,  these  nine  months  of  preparation  were.  We  had  been  uncon- 
sciously acquiring  the  ability  to  act  instinctively,  and  this  is  unquestionably 
the  most  important,  as  well  as  the  most  difficult  thing  a  soldier  must  gain. 

526 


12 

Work  must  always  be  done  with  the  sureness  and  promptitude  of  instinct. 
Otherwise,  in  the  heat  of  battle,  when  all  men  are  laboring  under  the  stress  of 
great  excitement,  the  soldier  is  lost  and  useless.  Battalions  must  be  units  in 
the  strictest  sense  of  the  word,  orders  must  be  obeyed  without  a  moment  of 
hesitancy.  *  *  * 

With  my  own  year  of  experience  as  a  criterion,  I  am  firmly  of  the  opinion 
that,  in  order  to  become  even  fairly  good  soldiers,  men  must  have  at  least  a 
year  of  training.  The  will  to  be  defenders  is  nothing  unless  there  is  back  of 
it  long  and  careful  preparation.  (Outlook,  Nov.  3,  1915.) 

With  all  this  intensive  training  over  a  period  of  nine  months  or 
more,  and  some  months'  actual  experience  in  war,  the  British  forces 
have  not  up  to  the  present  time  undertaken  a  sustained  general 
offensive. 

16.  DEDUCTIONS  FROM  BRITISH  LOSSES  IN  PRESENT  EUROPEAN 

WAR. 

That  wars  in  the  future  will  be  fought  by  men,  as  they  are  at 
present  and  always  have  been,  and  that  trained  officers  and  men  will 
be  required  in  ever-increasing  numbers  is  shown  by  the  enormous 
losses  sustained  by  the  British  Armies  from  the  beginning  of  the 
war  up  to  October  9,  as  announced  officially  by  Premier  Asquith  to 
the  House  of  Commons : 

Total  casualties,  493,294.     The  losses  for  the  western  area  were 
distributed  as  follows : 

Killed,  officers 4,401 

Wounded,  officers 9,  169 

Missing,  officers 1,  567 


Total 15, 137 

Killed,  other  ranks 63,  059 

Wounded,  other  ranks 225,  716 

Missing,  other  ranks 61,  134 

Total 349,  909 

Total  casualties  in  all  operations  : 

Killed,  officers 6,660 

Wounded,  officers 12,  633 

Missing,  officers 2,  000 

Total 21,293 


Killed,  other  ranks 94,992 

Wounded,  other  ranks 304,  832 

Missing,  other  ranks 72,  177 

Total 472,  001 

British  casualties  up  to  August  21,  as  given  officially  on  September 
14,  were  381,983.  This  shows  a  total  between  that  time  and  October 
9  of  111,311,  or  a  daily  average  of  2,271.  Losses  between  June  9 
and  August  21  averaged  about  1,500  daily. 

After  a  study  of  the  above  table  of  losses  it  is  not  understood  how 
anyone,  whether  civilian  or  soldier,  can  maintain  that  the  role  of 
the  human  element  in  war  has  been  or  can  be  decreased.  Rather  is 
it  seen  that  the  enormous  losses  suffered  by  troops  in  battle  require 
ever-increasing  numbers  of  men  to  be  trained  in  peace  and  held  in 


13 

reserve  to  take  the  place  of  the  fallen,  and  that  time  will  probably 
never  again  be  available  to  train  new  troops  in  large  numbers  after 
war  begins.  It  is  said  that  the  British  Regular  Army,  as  it  existed 
at  the  beginning  of  the  present  war,  practically  disappeared  during 
the  first  campaign  in  France;  that  is,  in  the  retreat  to  the  Marne 
and  the  subsequent  advance  to  the  Aisne.  The  British  losses  in 
officers  and  men  were  so  enormous  that  there  was  practically  no 
trained  personnel  left  available  for  the  instruction  of  the  new 
levies,  which  undoubtedly  accounts  somewhat  for  the  delay  in  send- 
ing the  new  units  to  France. 

17.  DEVELOPMENT  OF  ARMIES— PEACE  TRAINING  NECESSARY. 

"  The  time  requirel  for  raising  extemporized  armies  depends  largely 
on  the  presence  or  absence  of  trained  instructors.  If  there  be  a  corps  of 
trained  officers  and  noncommissioned  officers  and  a  tested  organization 
of  higher  units  with  trained  leaders  and  staff  officers,  the  problem  of 
training  is  limited  to  the  training  of  the  private  soldier.  *  *  * 
But  where  the  leaders  themselves  are  untrained,  and  where  the  officers 
and  men  must  alike  stumble  toward  efficiency  without  intelligent 
guidance,  the  formation  of  an  efficient  army  is  a  question  of  years; 
indeed,  such  a  force  can  not  become  an  army  at  all  within  the  period 
of  duration  of  modern  war.  The  American  war  of  1861-1865  presents 
the  singular  phenomenon  of  two  extemporized  armies  gradually  de- 
veloping while  in  conflict  with  each  other  and  is  a  most  remarkable 
record  of  the  evolution  of  such  forces.  In  the  conflicts  of  1861  both 
officers  and  men  were  untrained  for  the  duties  demanded  of  them. 
Even  the  companies  were  imperfectly  organized  as  units  of  the  regi- 
ments, and  the  lack  of  cohesion  was  still  more  apparent  in  the  higher 
units.  *  *  *  But  even  in  the  early  stages  of  the  war  the  influ- 
ence of  trained  and  able  leaders  was  apparent.  The  time  required 
to  make  an  effective  soldier  depends  very  largely  on  the  organiza- 
tion in  which  the  recruit  is  enrolled.  The  recruit  of  1861  could  not 
become  a  good  private  until  his  captain  became  a  good  captain,  but 
the  recruit  of  1863  was  absorbed  in  a  team  already  trained,  and 
therefore  became  a  trained  soldier  in  a  few  months  of  active  service. 
But,  while  the  history  of  the  Civil  War  is  instructive  as  a  record  of 
military  evolution,  it  can  not  be  invoked  as  a  guide  of  military  pol- 
icy, for  we  can  count  upon  it  that  in  our  career  as  a  world  power  no 
serious  competitor  will  ever  oppose  us  with  extemporized  armies. 
*  *  *  It  should  be  a  fundamental  principle  of  American  policy 
that  no  officer  should  be  intrusted  with  the  leadership  of  American 
soldiers  who  has  not  prepared  himself  for  that  responsibility  in 
time  of  peace.  The  American  soldier,  whether  regular  or  volun- 
teer, is  entitled  to  trained  leadership  in  war." — Organization  of  the 
Land  Forces,  1912. 

526 


14 
18.  CONCLUSIONS. 

The  present  European  war  has  demonstrated — 

1.  That  the  leading  of  an  untrained  or  partially  trained  and  ill- 
armed  citizen  soldiery  against  an  army  of  trained  veterans,  with  all 
the  enginery  of  modern  warfare,  results  in  useless,  senseless  slaughter. 

2.  That  in  direct  proportion  as  warfare  becomes  more  scientific, 
complicated,  and  expensive  does  it  require  longer  time  to  prepare 
for  war,  both  in  the  materiel  of  war  and  in  the  training  of  the 
soldiers. 

3.  That  the  United  States  can  not  rely  on  having  time  to  raise 
and  equip  new  armies  after  the  declaration  of  war,  unless  we  have 
allies  with  well-trained  armies  to  stand  between  us  and  disaster 
while  we  are  preparing.     Our  traditional  policy  has  been  against 
entangling  alliances. 

4.  That  in  making  deductions  from  the  operations  and  events  of 
the  present  European  war  we  should  consider  the  events  not  alone 
in  France  and  Flanders  and  the  Dardanelles,  which  have  developed 
into  siege  warfare,  but  the  operations  in  other  theaters  which  ap- 
proximate more  closely  what  would  happen  in  the  United  States 
should  they  be  attacked. 

5.  That  it  is  necessary  to  have  on  hand  at  the  beginning  of  war 
material  for  the  equipment  of  all  troops  to  be  mobilized  during  the 
first  three  months  of  the  war,  and  that  this  equipment  should  be 
accumulated  by  complete  division  units. 

6.  That  modern  armies,  to  be  successful,  must  be  well  balanced— 
that  is,  composed  of  the  proper  proportions  of  infantry,  cavalry, 
artillery,  and  special  troops — and  that  if  any  arm  or  corps  is  lack- 
ing in  time  of  peace  successful  military  operations  will  be  delayed 
until  it  is  brought  up  to  its  due  proportion. 

7.  That  in  the  wars  of  the  future  materiel  will  play  a  very  impor- 
tant part;  but  in  the  last  analysis  that  side  will  be  successful,  other 
things  being  equal,  which  can  longest  supply  reserves  of  adequately 
trained  and  disciplined  officers  and  men. 

526 

o 


THIS 


DATE 


AN  INITIAL  PINE  OF  25  CENTS 


T° 


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BOOK  ON  THE  DATE  DUE  THE 


1947 


MAY  27 


APRTTZDOT 


LD  21-100m-8,'34 


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